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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

No. 16355

LARRY VALE POTTER,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with three criminal counts
(all statutory references are to the Utah Code Annotated
(1953), as amended):
1.

Aggravated robbery in violation of § 76-6-302

2.

Failure to stop at the command of a police

(l)(a);

officer, in violation of§ 41-6-169.10; and
3.

Aggravated assault, in violation of

§

76-5-103.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury which found appellant
guilty as to counts one and two.

Appellant was acquitted of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the third count.
Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in
the Utah State Prison qf from five years to life, and fined
$2,000.

The prison sentence was suspended, as was $1,500 of

the fine.

Appellant was placed on probation for a period of

five years.
Appellant's probation was subsequently revoked, and
he was committed to the Utah State Prison to serve his original
sentence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his convictions for
aggravated robbery and failure to stop at command of a police
officer, and a reversal of the judgment revoking his probation
and committing him to the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on the morning of February 22, 1978, Mr. and Mrs. Von Wayne Johnston were awakened by
a knocking on the door of their home.

Mr. Johnston went to the

door, and observed appellant standing, armed with a revolver.
Mr. Johnston asked appellant what he wanted.
that he wanted to come in.

Appellant stated

He then entered the home.

Johnston again asked appellant what he wanted.

Mr.

Appellant re-

plied that he wanted a roll of toilet paper and some matches.
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston immediately procured toilet paper and
matches and placed them in appellant's hat.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Appellant then said to Mrs. Johnston, "Ma'am, it's
best that you go to the right.
this now

Me and your husband can handle

(Tr. 18.)
Appellant and Mr. Johnston then stepped outside.

Appellant fumbled with his hat and the toilet paper.
seemed nervous.

He

He thanked Mr. Johnston, and shook his hand.

Appellant then got in his car and drove off rather hurriedly.
Mr. Johnston went back inside.

Mrs. Johnston called the High-

way Patrol.
Officers intercepted appellant's auto soon thereafter.
After a high-speed chase in which appellant apparently discharged his revolver, and in which appellant tried to run the
pursuing officers off the road, he was finally subdued.
Mr. and Mrs. Johnston testified that during the incident in their home, appellant was always polite, although
he spoke with authority, and that he never threatened them
or raised his weapon.

Mr. and Mrs. Johnston agreed that ap-

pellant seemed in a daze, and that his eyes were without expression, staring blankly, starry-eyed.

Mr. Johnston testi-

fied that appellant appeared to be very incoherent, without
his senses, and "not in the same world as us" (Tr. 9).

Mr.

Johnston firmly felt that appellant was "on dope" and without
his faculties (Tr. 12, 16).
All of the arresting officers agreed that appellant
had none of the earmarks of a typical drunken driver, i.e.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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his speech was not slurred, he had no trouble walking, and
while he was driving in an extremely reckless manner, he appeared to have complete control of his vehicle.

They testi-

fied that appellant never pointed his revolver at any of them
during his arrest.
Officer Larry Prince testified that while he could
not detect whether appellant had been drinking, appellant was
acting "abnormally," was "incoherent," without his senses,
and "not in the same world as us" (Tr. 38, 39).
At approximately 3:00 a.m. appellant underwent a
blood alcohol test, which was introduced as evidence.

It

showed the concentration of ethyl alcohol in his blood to be
.24%, approximately 1-1/2 hours after the incident began.
This is three times the statutory presumption of intoxication.
Appellant testified that he had no memory of the
incident, that he recalled having about five drinks of whiskey,
and that his next memory was wakening in a jail cell.

The

evidence showed that in addition to the whiskey, appellant
had consumed quantities of beer, tequila, Colbenemid, and
Benemid.

The evidence also showed that appellant had suffered

a head injury in 1974 which left a "cortical scar," with resultant abnormal electroencephalogram, and that ap~ellant had
been under medication for gout since the age of 25, taking t'''o
tablets of Benemid or. Colbenemid every day, including the day
of the incident.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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After his conviction (from which this appeal was
perfected), appellant was placed on probation.
terms and

con~itions

Among the

of the probation set out in the judgment

of the trial court dated February 21, 1979, were the following:
3.

That the said defendant remain
in present treatment with Dr.
Lincoln Clark and enter alcohol
therapy as designated by the
Adult Probation and Parole
Department.

4.

That the said defendant submit to a breathalyzer test at
the discretion of the Adult
Probation and Parole Department
within reasonable circumstances
and hours.

5.

That the said defendant totally
abstain from the use of alcoholic beverages . . . .

The events whereby appellant allegedly violated the
conditions of his probation occurred very early on the morning
of April 27, 1979.

Officer Lawrence Penrod answered a call

and met Ms. Lucille Begay, who was at that time standing in
the driveway at the home of one Mr. Trokvine.

Ms. Begay re-

lated that she had been "assaulted" by appellant, and that she
wanted to get her clothes from the residence that appellant
shared with Mr. Randy Diamanti.
Officer Penrod proceeded with Ms. Begay to appellant's residence.

Two other peace officers were summoned, as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was Agent Nat Roth and Mr. Evan Reid.
on the scene

When Mr. Reid arrived

the entire party entered the residence, with the

consent of Ms. Begay.
Mr. Reid and the officers proceeded to appellant's
bedroom door.
locked.

Mr. Reid tested the knob, finding that it was

He then knocked on the door, awakening appellant.

Appellant came to the door where an extremely brief scuffle
ensued between appellant and Mr. Reid.

Appellant retreated in-

to his bedroom.
Mr. Reid asked appellant if he would submit to a
breathalyzer test.

Appellant, after asking if Mr. Reid had a

search warrant, stated that he had to get up early to go to
work, and was therefore returning to bed.

(These events appar-

ently occurred at approximately 1:00. a.m., the exact time
being unknown.

See Tr. 9.)

Appellant subsequently opened his bedroom door,
brought one drawer from a dresser, and deposited it on the
floor of the living room area, stating that it contained Ms.
Begay's clothing.

The clothing was gathered, and the entire

party then left the residence.
The trial court found that Ms. Begay had a sufficient
"proprietary interest" in appellant's residence to consent to
the entrance by Mr. Reid, Agent Roth, and the officers.

The

court further found that appellant had violated his probation,
and revoked the same.

Again, appellant appealed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE.
The definition of the offense of aggravated robbery
is to be found in the Utah Criminal Code.

(All statutory

citations are Utah Code Annotated (1953) unless otherwise indicated.)

Section 76-6-301 states:
Robbery is the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal
property in the possession of
another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of
force or fear.
(Emphasis
added.)

Section 76-6-302 states:
A person commits aggravated
robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a
knife or a deadly weapon; or (b)
causes serious bodily injury
upon another.
(Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the statutory offense of aggravated
robbery may be described as having four elements:
1.

There must be an intentional and
unjustifiable taking of personal
property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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2.

The property must be taken from
the person of another, or from his
immediate presence.

3.

Force or fear must be used to obtain the property.
The taking must
be against the will of the rightful
possessor.

4.

A gun, knife, facsimile thereof, or
a deadly weapon must be used to
provide the force or fear; or serious bodily injury must have resulted
to another.

Appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient
to support a conviction as to elements 2-4 above.

Appellant

is admittedly guilty of having committed acts that are of a
seriously antisocial nature.

The evidence did not, however, prove beyond a reasonable doubt the first element above described, an intentional
taking of property.
In order to determine what conduct constitutes "an
intentional taking," we must look first to the statutes.

The

definition of "intentional" is found in Section 76-2-103(1):
A person engages in conduct:
(1)
Intentionally, or with intent
or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire
to engage ~n the conduct or cause
the result.
(Emphasis added.)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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As discussed below, the evidence at trial showed
rather clearly that when appellant committed the acts in question, he was incapable of forming
. . . a conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.
(§ 76-2-103)(1), emphasis added.)
Section 76-2-103 is not the only statute dealing
with the so-called "mens rea" that is generally associated
with criminal liability.
Section 76-2-305 provides:
(1) In any prosecution for an
offense, it shall be a defense
that the defendant, at the time
of the proscribed conduct, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this section, the
terms "mental disease" or "defect"
do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated
criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct.
This author's research reveals only one case where
this court has dealt with this statute, State v. Dominguez,
564 P.2d 768 (Utah 1977).
assault was affirmed.

There a conviction for aggravated

The court held that the trial court's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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instructions on the defense of insanity were not prejudicial
to the defendant, even though they were not based on

§

76-2-305,

. . . because the District Court
gave as a part of its instruction
that insanity can exist when the
defendant is 'irresponsible or
1artly responsible.'
564 P.2d at 770, emphasis added
by the court.)
The court reasoned that therefore the defendant was
not denied the arguably more liberal defense that is provided
by § 76-2-305, which
. only requires defendant to
lack substantial capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct .
(564 P.2d at 770, emphasis supplied
by the court.)
As is discussed below, the evidence in the case at
bar clearly met the standard enunciated in Dominguez, supra,
to entitle appellant to an acquittal.
One other statute bears heavily on the question of
an "intentional taking."

Section 76-2-306 provides:

Voluntary intoxication shall not
be a defense to a criminal charge
unless such intoxication negates
the existence of the mental state
which is an element of the offense;
however, if recklessness or crirn~
nal negligence establishes an
element of an offense, and the
actor is unaware of the risk
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,-10administered by the Utah State Library.
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because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that
offense.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912),
a similar statute was discussed, § 4070, Comp. Laws 1907,
which provided:
No act committed by a person
while in a state of voluntary
intoxication is less criminal
by reason of his having been in
such condition. But whenever
the actual existence of any
particular purpose, motive, or
intent is a necessary element
to constitute any particular
species or degree of crime, the
jury may take into consideration
the fact that the accused was
intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose, motive or
intent with which he committed
the act.
(127 P. at 278.)
As is more thoroughly discussed in Point II of this
brief, this court reversed a first degree murder conviction
because of erroneous instructions based on this statute.

As

to the state of the law regarding the defense of voluntary
intoxication, the court noted:
Independently of a statute, it
is the general rule that, while
voluntary intoxication does not
excuse crime, and is usually not
a defense thereto, yet such condition of the accused at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time of the commission of the
offense may be considered in determining the purpose, motive,
or intent where these elements
become a material question of inquiry. And where one is charged
with the commission of first
degree murder, involving a
specific intent to commit the
crime of homicide, the accused
may show, in order to reduce the
degree of the offense, that he
was in such a state of voluntary
intoxication at the time of the
commission of the crime as to be
mentally incapable of forming
the necessary intent, or of entertaining or forming a design
to take life, and as bearing on
the existence or nonexistence of
malice, and to explain and determine the accused's conduct with
reference to the design, purpose,
motive, and intent with which the
act was committed. Extended notes
to cases in 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1024,
and 36 L.R.A. 470; 12 Cyc. 172,
21 Cyc. 674, and cases there cited.
This, in effect, is what the
statute declares.
(127 P. at 278-279.)
In State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050,
79 A.L.R. 878 (1931), a first degree murder conviction was reversed.

The court found, among other things, that the instruc-

tions given on intoxication were insufficient.

The court

quoted with approval from 16 Corpus Juris:
The rule that drunkenness is no
defense does not apply to the
full extent where a specific
intent or motive is an essential
element of the offense charged.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If at the time of the commission
of such an offense the accused
was by intoxication so entirely
deprived of his reason that he
did not have the mental capacity
to entertain the necessary specific intent which is required
to constitute the crime, he must
necessarily be acquitted; and in
like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness should be
considered in determining the
degree of the crime. This is so,
not because drunkenness excuses
crime but because if the mental
status required by law to constLtute crime be one of specific
intent or of deliberation and
premeditation, and drunkenness
excludes the existence of such
mental state, then the particular
crLme charged has not in fact
been committed.
(2 P.Zd 1053-1054, emphasis
added.)
As discussed below, the evidence in the case at bar
clearly showed that in fact appellant did not entertain the
"intent" necessary to constitute the crime of aggravated
robbery.
While the question of what conduct constitutes the
offense of aggravated robbery as defined by § 76-6-302 is of
course governed by statute, it is still possible to gain an
insight as to what constitutes an "intentional taking" by
looking to the case law, much of which predates the statute in
question.
In People v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895),
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a conviction for robbery was reversed, as the trial court's
instructions, based on the robbery statute, were incorrect.
The instructions neglected to cover the animus furandi, or
specific intent to steal, which is an element of robbery.

Our

court quoted with approval an Iowa case, State v. Hollyway,
41 Iowa 200 (1878) :
In robbery, as in larceny, it is
essential that the taking of the
goods be animo furandi. Unless
the taking be with felonious intent, it is not robbery.
(39P. at494.)
This rule is not only humane, but
a contrary one would be opposed
to all the principles which underlie human conduct as respects the
bearing of individuals towards each
other, and also as regards their
position towards the state.
(39 P. at 493-4.)
Accord:

State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
An interesting case, closely on point, is State v.

Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 545 (1909).
There, defendant had been convicted of forgery and uttering a
forged instrument.

Defendant did not deny the "acts" in ques-

tion, but asserted a defense based solely on insanity, i.e.,
mental defect.

The prosecution's case was based solely on

proof of the acts in question,
without in any way attempting
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to rebut or explain the evidence
of insanity submitted on behalf
of the defendant.
(102 P. at 642.)
The evidence of insanity (or lack of capacity) was
substantial (although there was also substantial evidence that,
at least at times, defendant acted rationally).

Among the

evidence going to insanity was the amateurishness of the
forgery (cf. taking toilet paper and matches); the fact that
some of defendant's ancestors were insane; the fact that defendant had long been responsibly employed; that defendant
felt the Japanese were the strongest race on earth, and that
this was due to their diet, which consisted largely of rice;
that defendant was obsessed with money and getting rich; that
defendant lied about making large amounts of money; that when
defendant's mother died, defendant was unconcerned, and had
stated that he had hypnotized her and cured her; that defendant did not take his prosecution seriously; that he neglected
his lodge duties; and that he did not feel that he had done
anything wrong.
Defendant had called 14 witnesses, all of whom
agreed that at the time of his act, defendant was mentally
unbalanced, did not know the nature and quality of his act,
and did not know or realize that his act was wrong.
The jury was properly instructed, but nevertheless
returned a verdict of guilty.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-ls-

Our Supreme Court reversed, holding that the guilty
verdict was not supported by the evidence, that the jury is
not at liberty to disregard affirmative evidence, and that a
jury verdict cannot be based on a mere presumption of sanity
where defendant presents evidence of lack of capacity.

The

court noted:
But if we assume that defendant
intended to forge the checks, which
he no doubt did, this is not alone
sufficient to make an insane person guilty of a crime.
The true test is whether the defendant, at the time of the commission of the offense, had the mental
capacity to know that in doing the
act he was doing wrong.
(102 P. at 645.)
The court held that the presumption of sanity had
been entirely overcome, and the guilty verdict ignored or disregarded the evidence, since the prosecution offered no evidence of defendant's sanity.

After defendant overcomes the

presumption of his sanity with evidence, the prosecution must
then prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court noted:
. . . whenever intent is an essential ingredient of the crime
charged, this intent, to constitute the act a crime, must be
shown . .
An insane person cannot be legally
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guilty of a criminal intent.
(102 P. at 645.)
Since all of the evidence on insanity was in defendant's favor, the court concluded that defendant had established his defense as a "matter of law," and concluded:
To convict a sane man who is
innocent is depolorable, but to
sentence a man.to the penitentiary for a crime that he did
not have the mental capacity to
commit would be intolerable.
(102 P. at 646.)
In State v. Hartley, 16 Utah 2d 123, 396 P.2d 749
(1964), a conviction of second degree burglary was affirmed,
but the court noted that voluntary intoxication can negate
the specific intent to commit larceny, which is an essential
element to second degree burglary (as well as robbery and
aggeavated robbery).

The issue, once raised, is for the jury.

In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931),
86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935), the conviction of first
degree murder resulting from defendant's first trial was reversed on several grounds.

The evidence showed that defendant

and his wife had been fighting, that defendant purchased a
knife, pistol, and ammunition, and that defendant had shot
and killed his ''ife, her mother, and the mother's husband.
The court held, inter alia, that the presumption of sanity
obtains until either defendant or the prosecution produces
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"some evidence" of insanity,

When evidence of insanity is

introduced, the presumption "disappears" and the jury must
determine the issue of sanity solely on the evidence, without
regard to the presumption.

It is for the trial judge, not the

jury, to determine if the evidence raises the issue of sanity
(i.e., it is a question of law), but only "some evidence" is
required before the issue must be sent to the jury.

If there

exists a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity, he is entitled to an acquittal, but insanity excuses only where it
renders defendant "irresponsible" or partly so.
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (1912),
supra, defendant was both intoxicated and jealous, as to his
wife's affections.

The wife determined to leave him.

took a hotel room.

Defendant went to the room, in an intoxi-

cated state, with a pistol.
to kill his wife and himself.

She

It was apparently his intention
He was quite loud.

He threat-

ened both his wife and another hotel guest and threatened to
kill "any cops" who entered the room.
moned.

The police were sum-

Three officers arrived at the room, and as they en-

tered, one asked a question to the effect of, "What is the
trouble?"

Defendant, who had concealed his pistol behind his

leg, replied to the effect that there was "no trouble," and
immediately drew the pistol and shot the lead officer in the
chest.

He died shortly thereafter.
The evidence at trial indicated that defendant had
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suffered from delerium tremens some six months earlier,

Both

expert and lay witnesses' testimony as to defendant's alecholic insanity was conflicting.
As is discussed more completely in Point II of this
brief, this court held that the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict of guilty of murder in the first
degree, but nevertheless reversed the conviction because the
trial court refused to give defendant's requested instructions.
The court, in Dewey, noted that Camp. Laws 1907
§

4856 placed the burden of production of evidence of justifi-

cation or excuse on defendant,
. . . but he is not required to
establish the justification or
excuse by a preponderance of the
evidence to avail himself of that
defense.
(127 P. at 280.)
Defendant has only to create a reasonable doubt.

The prosecu-

tion must still prove all the elements in issue, including
mental capacity, beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Accord:

State

v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 P. 497 (1911).)
With this outline of the law before us, let us now
look to the evidence that was produced at the trial of the
instant case.
The State's first witness was Mr. Von W. Johnston.
In addition to those facts previously recited, he testified
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in cross-examination that appellant's eyes looked "unusual"
(Tr. 8), that he had a "blank stare" (Tr. 8), that he appeared
"abnormal" (Tr. 9), and "incoherent," "in one sense of the
word" CI'r, 9).

Mr. Johnston testified that it was his impres-

sion that appellant "did not have his senses," and that he
"was not even in the same world as us" (Tr. 9).

He felt that

appellant was in a "very emotional and mental state" (Tr. 9).
Appellant never pointed his revolver at Mr. Johnston (Tr. 10),
and seemed very polite, and thanked Mr. Johnston for the toilet
paper and matches (Tr. 5, 10), and shook his hand before leaving (Tr. 5).

Mr. Johnston testified that appellant seemed

"uncoordinated" as he left (Tr. 10), and that he didn't keep
Mrs. Johnston constantly in his sight, as an "ordinary robber"
would be expected to do (Tr. 11).
On redirect examination, Mr. Johnston was asked by
the prosecuting attorney:
Q:

You said he [appellant] was
very abnormal in one sense
of the word. ~~at was that
sense of the word?

A:

Well, he looked to me as if
he had been on dope. This
is the first thing that come
into my mind, that the man
was on dope, and he hasn't
got his faculties in his
mind, and that he might be
an irrational person that
could do anything, you
know
(Tr. 12,)
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After a short recross-examination, the prosecuting
attorney questioned Mr. Johnston as to appellant's "physical
ability to handle himself, his ability to stand and to walk
and to talk, to ask questions [ . ] " (Tr. 15) .

The prosecutor

asked:
Q:

Well, looking back--going
on what you observed about
the defendant today and at
the preliminary hearing,
and thinking back to February 22nd--we've gone over
this before but I think we
need to verify this--his
ability to walk, his ability
to stand or move around,
some of the things that
you've observed--is there
any difference [between
appellant's appearance at
trial and on the morning of
the incident]?

A:

Yes. I've observed that the
night that he come to my
house--! don't think that
he was drunk in that manner,
but I do think--I still
think that he acted like a
person that was on dope. Because he just had a blank
stare, which he doesn't have
today. And I haven't heard
him talk today so I don't
know his normal voice. In
fact, I never heard the man
talk except that night (Tr.
15,16).

The State's next witness was Hazel Lorraine Johnston,
Hr. Jonston's wife.

On direct examination she stated that
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"[Appellant] seemed to be in a daze, sort of starry-eyed.
His eyes didn;t have any expression in them" (Tr. 19).

She

further testified on cross-examination that appellant's tone
of voice on the night in question was "co=anding," like "a
sergeant or somebody giving orders, or someone in the army[.]"
(Tr. 25).
On redirect examination the prosecuting attorney
asked:
Q:

Relating to the defendant,
in your observation of his
senses in his ability to
perform, would you tell the
Court what you--or the jury
what you observed? Did he
have his senses in your
opinion?

A:

Well, I don't think it was
so much the way he acted
that we thought, you know,
there was something--it was
what he asked for--to come
into someone's horne and ask
for toilet paper and matches.
That's just got to be something wrong. That was more
the reason why I thought
there had to be something
wrong (Tr. 26).

To quickly su=arize the evidence to this point,
both of the victims of the crime testified that "something Has
wrong" with appellant's mental state.
dope" (Tr. 12).

He seemed to be "on

They reached this conclusion because of what

appellant asked for (Tr. 26), because of his unusual blank
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stares, and his incoherent, drugged appearance (see Tr. 8,9,
10,12,15,16,19,22,26,27,28,29).
The next witness in the case was Officer Larry
Prince of the East Carbon City Police Department (Tr. 29).

He

testified that he had been involved in the high-speed chase of
appellant.

During the chase, the officer's vehicle "reached

speeds of over a hundred--probably close to 110 [miles per
hour]" (Tr. 30).
The officer testified that appellant almost caused
a head-on collision '"ith another police car (Tr. 32); that he
tried to disable yet another police car by slamming on his
brakes to cause a rear-end collision and by ramming the same
car's right front (fender) in a swerving maneuver (Tr. 33).
Finally, appellant stopped his vehicle about a mile
short of a roadblock which had been set up (Tr. 34).

Officer

Prince testified that after appellant had stopped his vehicle,
Officer Penrod exited his car,
using his door as cover. I positioned my car to the left rear of
Officer Penrod's car. I exited
my car using my door as cover.
We ordered the subject out of the
car, which he did. And he was
standing there with the--a weapon
in his hand, waving it with the
barrel down. And Officer Penrod
told him several times to put it
down. And at one time he said:
'Put the gun down and don't do
anything stupid.' And finally he
did put the gun down. Officer
Penrod and Sheriff Passic carne up
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-23Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

and subdued the subject. And I
came up and I grabbed the weapon
at that time.
(Tr. 34.)
On cross-examination the officer testified that
appellant had not pointed his gun at him (the officer) while
appellant had been standing in the road (Tr. 36) .

Further, the

officer testified that he agreed with Mr. Johnston's testimony
that appellant was, at the time of the incident, "very abnormal,"
that appellant's eyes were "very unusual," and that appellant
"had a blank stare," and that appellant was in a "very emotional and

mental state that night," that he was "incoherent,"

that "he didn't even have his senses," and that it "didn't even
seem that [appellant] was in the same world as us."

(See Tr.

37,38.)
The officer also testified that v1hile he could not
detect the smell of alcohol on appellant, he had reason to believe that appellant was under the influence of alcohol, "to
the point that [appellant] had to submit to a blood test[.]"
The officer stated that the blood test showed appellant's
blood concentration of alcohol to be .24%, three times the
statutory presumption for driving under the influence (Tr. 41,
42).
Finally, Officer Prince was asked, and replied to,
the following:

Q:

All of these that you agreed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-24Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to: Eyes unusual, blank
stare, very abnormal, incoherent, not even have his
senses, not in the same
v1orld as us, emotional and
in a mental state--and you
don't say that he's any of
them now, do you, as you
sit and look at him?
A:

No, sir.

(Tr. 43.)

Officer Larry Penrod and Norman Vuksinick also testified for the State.

Their testimony was corroborative of that

of Officer Prince.
At this point, it should be noted that the State's
case raised sufficient evidence to defeat any presumption of
appellant's sanity, and therefore placed the burden on the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only that appellant had the requisite "intentional" state of mind, but also
that he had the requisite "capacity" to commit a crime.

(State

v. Bro>vn, supra; State v. Green, supra; State v. Dewey, supra;
State v. Vacos, supra;

§§

76-6-301, 76-6-302, 76-2-103,

76-2-305, 76-2-306.)
The State failed to sustain this burden.

It pre-

sented absolutely no evidence to the effect that appellant had
the requisite capacity or intent.

Therefore, on this basis

alone, appellant's conviction must be reversed.
The case for the defense produced still more evidence showing that appellant lacked the requisite intent and
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capacity.
Appellant called two witnesses 01r. Marvin Dalton
and Hr. Gary Grako) who testified as to his general reputation
in the community as a nonviolent person (see Tr. 62-65).
Appellant testified in his own behalf.

He stated

that he did not remember the events of the night in question
(Tr. 67).

He also testified that he received a head injury in

1974, which left a scar on the left rear area of his head
(Tr. 68, note that this is an external scar, not the "cortical
scar" which was revealed by the electroencephalogram, and which
is discussed further below) .

He further testified that he had

been taking medication (Colbenemid and Benemid) daily for gout,
for about five years (Tr. 75).
As to the day of the events in question, appellant
testified that the last thing he remembered was being at the
Eagle's Lodge at about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 69,70,79).

He

recalled having roughly five drinks, blended whiskey mixed
with water (Tr. 70).

The next thing he remembered was waking

in a jail cell (Tr. 71).

Appellant could not recall any of

the acts, as to the alleged robbery, or as to the high-speed
chase with the police (Tr. 71,77).
He stated that he had never had a prior "problem"
from taking his medication and drinking at the same time
(Tr. 78), although he had in fact taken the drugs and drank
simultaneously before (Tr. 79).
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On redirect examination, appellant stated that he
had never behaved before in the manner which he acted on the
night in question (Tr. 81), even though he had been intoxicated before.
Appellant's next witness was Dr. Lincoln Clark, a
physician and psychiatrist.

Dr. Clark is a graduate of the

Harvard Medical School (Tr. 83).

He was a resident at the

Massachusetts Medical Hospital in Boston for three years in
internal medicine (Tr. 83).

He then spent three years as a

resident at the !1assachusetts General Hospital in psychiatry
(Tr. 83).

He then studied neurology in Great Britain's Hospi-

tal Training Center while attending the University of London
(Tr. 83).

He then returned to Boston where he did research

as a junior medical faculty member (Tr. 83).

After serving

two years as a military psychiatrist in Germany, he came to
Utah, where he became a full-time member of the faculty of the
College of Medicine at the University of Utah (Tr. 83,84).
He is presently teaching at the College of Medicine, where he
is a full professor of psychology and pharmacology (Tr. 84).
His field of interest is the area of drug effects and human
behavior (Tr. 84).

He is also currently a consultant to the

State of Wyoming as a forensic psychiatrist, and to the Utah
State Training School of American Fork (Tr. 84).

At this

latter institution alone Dr. Clark takes care of some 900
nsychiatric and behavior problems, and some 900 brain damage
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rehabilitated individuals (Tr. 84).

At the College of Medi-

cine he teaches, among other things, the block of classes that
deals with drug abuse and alcoholism in the pharmacology
courses.

This block is taught in all medical schools (Tr. 85).

Finally, based on his professional integrity, Dr. Clark testified as a witness without compensation from appellant or appellant's counsel (Tr. 108,109).
Dr. Clark testified that it was his opinion that
during the incident in question appellant
. . . was in a period of severe
impairment of his usual mental
faculties; and that there is a
disorganized, chaotic quality to
his behavior, if not a bizarre
quality[,] evidenced throughout
this whole story. And on [my]
basic experience it is the
description of a behavior of
an individual who has impairment
because of brain disfunction
(sic) from some cause.
Now, in analyzing this case the
biggest question is what was
the nature of this cause, what
made this episode of intoxication different from previous
ones? Because the subject is
not unused to the effects of
alcohol. He knows generally what
to expect from it. But this episode had a quality and led to
behaviors that are tota~t of
character w~th this indiv~dual.
Now, given a situation like this,
one would try to obtain what information one can in terms of
what was different. Some of the
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possibilities are that the
amount of alcohol, assuming
alcohol is a critical factor-that his exposure was very much
more massive or heavy than the
experiences before. Now, the
subject does not recall his
drinking as being excessive-more excessive than usual. He
can recall drinking comparable
amounts without this happening.
The other possibility is he could
have used a beverage that he was
not familiar with or not as used
to, or there was more toxic in
this substance (sic) .
For example, in this instance
the subject told me that he recalls drinking tequila, which is
not an ordinary beverage with
him. And he would recall in
Vietnam he would become severely
intoxicated on tequila. Tequila
is a beverage which has its
more than its usual share of intoxicating substances other than
alcohol. (sic)
And the other possibility is
that someone added some other
drug . .
(Tr. 88,89, emphasis
added.)
Dr. Clark testified specifically about the drug
Benemid, and the special significance of the fact that appellant has taken the drug daily for over five years.
Benemid is a substance that is
used for the treatment of gout.
It exercises its action by
blocking the kidneys, blocks the
transport of acids and other compounds. In other words, if there
was toxic materials entering his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-29Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Now, finally, the key point, I
think here, is that this man had
a head injury to the left side of
his head in 1974. Because of the
similarity of the bizarre quality
of his behavior in this occasion,
I was concerned that it might
represent the occurrence of a
form of epilepsy that can be
adduced bt alcohol and by alcohol
withdrawa . And that is the reason for sending him for an electroencephalogram. The findings
of that electroencephalogram were
surprising and I think extremely
relevant to this case.
(Tr. 90,
91, emphasis added.)
A graph recording of the electroencephalogram was
then introduced into evidence.

Dr. Clark then proceeded to

show the jury the "spikes " which represented electrical brain
activity from appellant's temporal lobe (Tr. 91,92).

Dr. Clark

continued:
The significance of that is that
the temnoral lobe is the part of
zour brain that is involved in
~ntegrat~ng the complex behav~ors.
It is also a cr~t~cal factor ~n
remember~ng what happens.
Arid
th~s ~s a man now Ln a normarstate, not under the ~nfluence
of drugs, who has a spLke dLscharge, a temporal lobe focus
that LS firing at regular intervals. The presumption is that
he has a cortical scar secondarv
to the braLn LnJury Ln 19/4.
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Now, the condition of alcohol
withdrawal, because alcohol is
a repressive with blood activity,
when it is being excreted, there
is a release; and as you know,
people withdrawing from alcohol
can have seizures. Now, the location of th~s--he would not
necessarily have a generalized
convulsion, but have ps¥chomotive
seizures, that is assoc~ated w~th
disorganized behavior often in a
dream-l~ke state ~n wh~ch the
~nd~v~dual can act in a bizarre
fashion but fragments of his
normal behavior would be present
such as walking and so forth.
So in brief, my assumption is
that this man has indeed a temooral lobe focus that he was not
aware of that ~s probably related
to the injury in '74. It's veri
common that this not show ~tsel
for some ears after in"ur ; because t e scar forms gradua
and usually several years w~l
elapse before this becomes si~ni
ficant. Arid ~t may never, ~n eed,
become frontally significant, had
he not been exposed to the lasting
effects of alcohol intoxication
and whatever else may have been
involved in that eoisode.
(Tr. 92,93, emphasis added.)

t

Dr. Clark and appellant's counsel then went through
the following colloquy:

Q

Now, do you have an opinion,
Doctor, as to whether or not
it would be consistent with
his going through the acts
that have been testified to
by the officers and the
Johnstons, and still because
of the effects that you've
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described to the jury--that
the defendant would not in
fact remember doing them?
A

He would not remember, no.

Q

And would there at least be
a reasonable doubt that
under the circumstances he
could not form a specific
intent to perform these
crimes of robbery and aggravated robbery?

A

Yes. I think there would
be a reasonable doubt.

Q

And would it be reasonable
that he would not have a
conscious objective or desire to engage in that
particular conduct or any
particular conduct or cause
any particular result?

A

Yes.

Q

And was in your oplnlon the
information that you have
heard in court and what information the defendant gave
you about his past history,
et cetera, in arriving at
the opinion--do you have an
opinion as to whether or not
you believe the witness was
telling you the truth-- or
the defendant was telling
you the truth when he gave
you his background information?

A

Yes.

Q

. Would it be consistent
with your opinion that he
could be taking medicine on

(Tr. 93.)
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previous occasions, a large
amount of alcohol at the
same time on previous occasions, and still not go into
one of these
A

Oh, yes.

Q

What do you call them -like a seizure from amnesia?

A

Associated disorganized behavior.

Q

And if he ordinarily drank
Canadian Club or blended
bourbon, but on this occasion he had that plus
tequila, could they be
reasonably one of the causes
that would --

A

Yes. It could be the total
quantity involved as well as
the possibility of additional
substances of beverages of a
toxic effect, yes.

Q

And do you have an op~n~on
as to whether or not the defendant is in any way feigning his responsibility by
saying: "I don't remember
anything from 9:00 or 9:30
on until the next morning?"

A

Yes.

Q

And what is that opinion?

A

I believe he is telling the
truth.

Q

And you believe that under
the circumstances he could
not form the specific intent
necessary for the conviction
of the crime?

I do have an opinion.
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A

That's correct.
95.)

(Tr. 94,

On cross-examination, Dr. Clark maintained, as to
appellant's testimony, that he remembered nothing of the incident,
I think the description of what
occurred is . . . characteristic
of a person who has had an organic
brain syndrome, associated with
epilepsy, of organic diffusion[,]
to have this type of global memory
loss. It's 6uite characteristic.
(Tr. 97, emp asis added.)
On further cross-examination, Dr. Clark explained in
more detail the nature of the epileptic seizure that appellant
subject to on the night in question.
[Epileptics] can become very disorganized on temporal lobe seizures. That's the expression,
is chaotic [sic]. It's not a
convulsion--is probably what
you're thinking about [sic].
But there's any variance of epilepsy . And where some
lesion is located, produces a
certain type of abnormal behavior
[sic]. It is evident in disruotion of the normal ability to
carry out organized behavior.
But there may be fragments of
automatic old behavior patterns.
walking, driving a car, on making
old familiar resoonses. But the
important thing is the chainingtogether of these lnto organized
senslble patterns, ~,<7hlch can be
dlsruptlve. (Tr. 101, emphasis
added.)
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On redirect examination, Dr. Clark was asked:

Q

What is your opLnLon relative to the order: "Give
me your toilet paper and
matches?"

A

I don't know. Except -and I can only speculate
this man spent three years
in combat in Vietnam. He
was a sergeant and a squad
leader. One of the components of C-Rations that's
given-- there's a kind of
dessert and a can of fruit
and cigarettes, matches,
and toilet paper -- given
in addition to their regular
can of beans or whatever.
And matches and toilet
paper are very important,
as is pointed out in Vietnam. You can't go to the
local IGA to get your toilet
paper. So it's perfectly
possible, and it happens in
temporal lobe seizures, that
he had digressed to a dreamlike state and was reacting,
as he once did, as [if] he
was in a totally different
situation. So I think the
main association I could
draw from him and from this
episode, was he was in Vietnam and then to the contents of the C-Ration, this
little packet of toilet
paper and matches. And he
wanted toilet paper and
matches. This is the only
hypothesis I could develop
about why this strange thinking would come into his mind.
But it is known that under
the influence of alcohol,
and during the periods of
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abnormal discharge of the
temporal lobe, there can
be old memories evoked.
People will react in terms
of these old memories.
They'll go back to these
other places in their memories. This happens when
people are recovering from
anesthesia. They'll feel
they're back in some location and old memories will
come back to them. So I
think this man was functioning at a disorganized, primitive level.

Q

Would that be consistent
with reasonableness, when
the Johnstons testified as
if he was in full command,
giving directions to Mrs.
Johnston to go to the right
and things such as that?

A

Hell, again, I think this man
has been in a position of
command, that giving orders
would be habitual as an army
sergeant. Also organizing
other fragments of his character, with his habitual
politeness, which came out -about his presence in this
otherwise chaotic picture.
He was acting in this bizarre
way and then at the same time
politeness. This is a chaotic
mixture of old behaviors and
character traits, politeness,
and having been an army sergeant, mixed in with this
strange mixture of activities.

Q

And would that also be your
opinion relative to the fact
that he appeared to the
officers to be driving all
right, walking all right,
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even though his blood
alcohol oroved to be as
great as.it was?
A

Yes. I think that this
man's blood alcohol is in
a level that is high, but
in an individual who
drinks regularly, he
could have enough tolerance not to show the motor
impairment, the slurred
speech, the incoordination.
That's why I think particularly there was an additional element going on,
and I think that additional
element is reflected in
this tracing.
(Indicating [the spikes on the
electroencephalogram).)
And it is quite consistent
with the behavior given.

Under the statutes and case law cited above, it is
clear that the jury's guilty verdict of the count of aggravated
robbery is not supported by the evidence.
It is of some significance that the jury acquitted
appellant of the count charging aggravated assault against
Officer Norman Vuksinick.

It is uncontradicted that appellant

committed the acts therein charged.

That is, he used his ve-

hicle in a manner calculated to wreck the officer's car, while
the officer was still in it.

Such an act is certainly "such

means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury[,)" as defined by

§

76-5-103 (_b) Utah Code Annotated

(1953).
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In State v. Howell, 545 P.2d 1326 (Utah 1976), this
court held that under this section of the aggravated robbery
statute, only a general intent, or awareness of what is done,
is sufficient to satisfy the mental element of the offense.
It would seem that the jury's verdict, in acquitting appellant
of aggravated assault, represents a finding that appellant in
fact lacked the requisite mental capacity.
Nevertheless, the jury found that appellant had the
mental capacity to act "intentionally" as to the alleged aggravated robbery.

As was discussed above, the aggravated robbery

statute, § 76-6-302 Utah Code Annotated (1953), requires a
specific larcenous intent.

(Also see State v. Howell, supra,

as to the "specific intent" requirement where the statute requires an "intentional" act.)
For the jury to find appellant innocent of an offense
that requires only a general intent, while convicting him of
an offense that requires a specific intent, is clearly inconsistent.

It serves to illustrate that the jury's verdict of

guilty of aggravated robbery is in conflict with the evidence.
From the evidence of the State's case, the issue of
appellant's capacity was raised, and the presumption of capacity was defeated.

Indeed, it is arguable that the State's

case itself raised a reasonable doubt whether appellant entertained an "intentional" state of mind.
The evidence produced for the defense, especially
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the testimony of Dr, Clark, was conclusive that appellant
lacked an "intentional" state of mind.

It was also conclusive

that appellant suffered from a "mental disease or defect" that
resulted in his lacking "substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."

He was clearly entitled to

an acquittal under the defense provided by

§

76-2-305.

Even if it is assumed that appellant's mental condition was one of "voluntary intoxication," the evidence still
clearly shows a lack of the "intentional" mental element required.

Therefore, under

§

76-2-306, appellant would be simi-

larly entitled to an acquittal.
Unquestionably, the evidence raised at least a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant had the required culpable mental element.

It is of great significance that the

prosecution in no way even attempted to prove, by its own evidence, that appellant had the "intentional" state of mind.
The State's case was based on proof of the acts, and that
alone is not sufficient.
The case of State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641,
24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 545 (1909), supra, seems controlling here.
Appellant presented substantial, indeed conclusive,
evidence of lack of capacity, which the prosecution in no way
rebutted.

The prosecution did not even attempt to rebut it.
While the jury is indeed the trier of fact, it may
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not disregard affirmative evidence.

Nor may a jury base a

guilty verdict on a mere presumption of sanity where there is
affirmative evidence that the defendant

lac~ed

mental capacity.

Therefore, appellant's conviction for aggravated robbery must
be reversed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY.
Appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 stated:
Voluntary intoxication is an
absolute defense to a crime
charged where such intoxication
negates the existence of the
mental state required as an element of said crime.
Therefore, should you find that
the defendant was intoxicated at
the time the alleged acts occurred,
as a result of the consumption of
alcohol or drugs or both, you must
determine whether his intoxication
was of a degree which would negate
the existence of the mental state
required as an element of the
offenses charged against the defendant.
In this case, the defendant has
been charged with three offenses
and all three offenses require
that the defendant have acted intentionally or willfully. Such
a mental state is defined at law
as being where it is one's conscious objective or desire to
engage in a particular conduct or
cause a particular result. Should
you find that the defendant was,
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as a result of his intoxication,
unable to form the necessary
intent to engage in unlawful
conduct or cause unlawful results, you must find him not
guilty.
The trial court felt that it had given the instruction in substance in its Instruction Number 8, which stated:
Our law provides that 'no act
committed by a person while in
a state of voluntary intoxication
is less criminal by reason of his
having been in such condition.'
This means that such a condition,
if shown by the evidence to have
existed in the defendant at the
time when allegedly he committed
the crime charged, is not of itself a defense. It may throw
light on the occurrence and aid
you in determining what took place;
but when a person in a state of
intoxication, voluntarily produced
in himself, commits a crime, the
law does not permit him to use his
own vice as a shelter against the
normal, legal consequences of his
conduct.
However, when the existence of any
particular motive, purpose or intent is a necessary element to
constitute a particular kind or
degree of crime the jury, in determining whether or not such motive,
purpose or intent existed in the
mind of the accused, must take
into consideration the evidence
offered to prove that the accused
was intoxicated at the time when
the crime allegedly was committed.
This fact requires an inquiry into
the state of mind under which the
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defendant committed the act
charged, if he did commit it.
In pursuing that inquiry, it is
proper to consider whether he
was intoxicated at the time of
the alleged offense. The weight
to be given the evidence on that
question and the significance to
attach to it, in relation to all
the other evidence, are exclusively within your province.
The Court's instruction erroneously construes the
voluntary intoxication statute,
(1953) .

§

76-2-306 Utah Code Annotated

It should be noted that the statute is found in Part

of Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code.

The title of Chapter 2 is

"PRINCIPLES OF CRH1INAL RESPONSIBILITY," and the title of Part
is "Defenses to Criminal Responsibility."
The statute states:
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication.-Voluntary intoxication shall not be
a defense to a criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the
existence of the mental state which
is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal
negligence establishes an element
of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness
is immaterial in a prosecution for
that offense.
(Emphasis added.)
Clearly, when the offense charged requires an "intentional" mental state, and intoxication negates the existence of such a state, then such intoxication is, of itself,
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an absolute defense.

See State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350,

2 P.2d 1050, 79 A.L.R. 878 (1931), cited supra in Point I.
This court therein stated

tha~

when one is so intoxicated that

he does not entertain the requisite mental capacity for the
offense charged, "he must necessarily be acquitted."

(2 P.2d

at 1054, emphasis added.)
The trial court's instruction specifically states
that such intoxication is not a defense.

It quotes, and is

obviously based upon, an old statute dealing with voluntary
intoxication (Section 7910, Penal Code, Comp. Laws Utah 1917).
It charged the jury that appellant's intoxication "may throw
light on the occurrence and aid you in determining what took
place;" but that appellant cannot "use his own vice as a shelter against the normal, legal consequences of his conduct."
The instruction misstates the law, and misled the
jury, to the prejudice of appellant's case.

It merely states

that intoxication is to be taken "into consideration" on
whether or not a "motive, purpose or intent existed in the
mind of the accused."

It does not define "intent," nor did it

refer to the definition of "intentional" to be found elsewhere
in the court's instructions.

It did not refer, even obliquely,

to the fact that if appellant's intoxication was such that it
negated an "intentional" state of mind, he must be acquitted.
The given instruction further invited the jury to
speculate on the issue, by stating the significance to be
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given the evidence in this regard was "exclusively within [the
jury's] province.
Appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 was therefore not given in substance by the trial court.

Appellant's

proposed instruction was based on the current Utah statutory
provisions dealing with subject.

It correctly states that vol-

untary intoxication may be an absolute defense, and it gave
clear, concrete guidance as to how the question of intoxication
relates to the issue of an "intentional" state of mind.
instruction should have been given.

The

Since it was not, the jury

may well have improperly applied an erroneous construction of
the law to the facts, resulting in appellant's conviction for
a crime that he did not have the capacity to commit.
Appellant offered three other instructions on the
issue of the mental elements to offenses charged.

Appellant's

proposed Instruction Number 4 stated:
When a person commits an act without being conscious thereof, he
does not thereby commit a crime
even though such an act would constitute a crime if committed by a
person when conscious. The state
of unconsciousness to which I refer in this instruction is a condition experienced by a person
normally sane, wherein there is no
functioning of the conscious mind,
and the person's acts are controlled by the subconscious mind.
An example of the type of unconsciousness to which this instruction refers is where a person
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performs acts while under involuntary intoxication produced by
alcohol or drugs.
Involuntary intoxication is intoxication forced upon a person
or intoxication incurred from
one's not knowing of the nature
of the substance ingested or
knowing of its effect when combined with another substance.
Should you find that defendant
was under involuntary intoxication to the extent that there was
no functioning of the conscious
mind at the time of the alleged
criminal acts, you must find the
defendant not guilty.
Proposed Instruction Number 6 stated:
For every crime with which the
defendant is charged in this
case, there must not only be unlawful acts, but also there must
be unlawful intents, and the acts
and intents must happen at the
very same instance.
If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged
unlawful acts occurred, you still
may not find the defendant guilty
of any offenses charged until and
unless you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt the alleged unlawful intents also occurred, and
at the very same instance with
the alleged unlawful acts.
In determining the existence of
the alleged unlawful intents, you
may consider the combination of
the effects of alcohol, drugs,
and mental disorders on the defendant's mind at the time of the
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alleged unlawful acts.
For example, even if you should
find there initially v7as voluntary intoxication on the part of
the defendant, if you have reasonable doubt that the effects
of alcohol, drugs, mental disorders or any combination thereof
caused the absence of the necessary unlawful intents, as elsewhere in these instructions were
specifically discussed, then you
must find the defendant not guilty.
Proposed Instruction Number 7 stated:
The theory of the defense in this
case is that although the defendant did in fact perform the unlawful acts complained of, he did
not possess the necessary unlawful
intents for his conscious objectives or desires to engage in the
particular conduct or cause the
particular results.
In support of this theory, the defendant contends a combination of
the influence of alcohol, drugs
and mental disorders prevented
the existence of the necessary
unlawful intents or even memories
of those acts.
The defendant has no burden of proof
whatsoever and surely does not have
to convince you beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the absence of such unlawful intents.
On the contrary, the State has the
burden of proof to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt as to the
presence of such unlawful intents.
Therefore, if you have a reasonable
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doubt as to the presence or
absence of the necessary unlawful intents at the very same
instance as the necessary unlawful acts, it is your duty
to find the defendant not guilty.
The trial court declined to give these instructions,
or any part of them.

Rather, the court gave two instructions

on the issue of the requisite mental state.

The court's In-

struction Number 6 stated:
No person is guilty of an
offense unless his conduct is
prohibited by law and he acts
intentionally or knowingly with
respect to each element of the
offense as defined for you by
these instructions. It does
not require a specific intent to
violate the law but merely an
intent to engage in the acts or
conduct that constitute the elements of the offense.
Therefore, if you find that the
mental condition of the defendant at the times of the alleged
offenses was such that he did
not have the intent as that term
has been defined for you in
these instructions to perform
the acts or conduct required
for the commission of the offense
charged, or if you entertain a
reasonable doubt thereof, then
vou should find the defendant not
guilty of the crimes charged.
Instruction Number 7 stated:
You are instructed that under the
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I~

Utah law a person engages in conduct intentionally with respect
to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct when
it is his conscience objective or
desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.
The given instructions are somewhat inconsistent and
misleading.

Number 6 stated that "a specific intent to violate

the law" is not required, and of course this is true.

But the

instruction then states that a mere "intent to engage in the
acts or conduct" is sufficient for a conviction.

This is not

the case for an offense that requires an "intentional" state of
mind, and obviously this part of Instruction Number 6 conflicts
with Instruction Number 7.
In State v. Green, 78 Utah 580, 6 P.2d 177 (1931),
86 Utah 192, 40 P.2d 961 (1935), the court, quoting from Jensen
v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 360, 270 P. 349 (1927), stated:
. . . that the g~v~ng of inconsistent instructions is error and
sufficient ground for a reversal
of the judgment, because, after
verdict, it cannot be told which
instruction was followed by the
jury, or what influence the erroneous instruction had on their
deliberations.
(6 P.2d at
183-4.)
While appellant concedes that Instruction Number 7
correctly gives the statutory definition of "intentional." it
was nevertheless insufficient to cure the error in Instruction
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Number 6.

Further, while it correctly states the abstract

definition, it gave the jury no guidance in applying that
definition to the facts of the case.
In State v. Dewey, 41 Utah 538, 127 P. 275 (_1912),
cited supra in Point I, this court reversed a conviction of
first degree murder.

The court found that the evidence sup-

ported the jury's verdict, and that the instructions given
were correct abstract statements of the law.

Nevertheless,

the court reversed, holding such instructions were insufficient
when the defendant had requested instructions relating the
specific facts of the case to the law.

The court noted that

the given instruction in question was well stated in the abstract,
But the duty of the court is not
always discharged by merely giving
the jury an abstract and lexical
definition of a thing, as was done
here. Litigants are entitled to
have the court declare the law
applicable to the particular facts
of the case; to charge concretely,
not abstractly. A charge which
applies the law to the facts of
the case, and states to the jury
the crucial question or questions
involved, which they, upon the
evidence, must answer, is much
more helpful to them, and conduces
far more to a just administration
of the law, than mere abstract
propositions of law, dissertations
on sound theories, or lexical definitions of things, concerning the
application of which the jury are
left in doubt or allowed to make
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as they might think proper . . . .
Tne general and abstract charge as
here given applies as well to different facts of a hundred or more
• cases as to the one in hand. He
think the defendant was entitled
to a charge substantially as requested, and that it was not given.
(127 P. at 277.)
In Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366, 270 P. 349
(1927), then Justice Straup observed:
As a general rule a trial court
should not leave the jury to apply
mere general principles of law to
a case, as here was done by the
defendant's requests. The court
should give the jury what the law
is as applied to the facts either
stated or assumed, and if so found
by the jury. The rule is well
settled that instructing a jury as
a mere abstract or general statement as to the law should be avoided,
and that all instructions should be
applicable to evidence on either
one or the other of the respective
theories of the parties. Instructions which are not so applicable,
though abstractly they may be correct, are not helpful to the jury,"
are apt to be misleading and to be
improperly applied. That a proposition may be correct in a sense, and
yet be inapplicable to the evidence
or to the issue, is readily perceived.
(270 P. at 357.)
Appellant's proposed instructions 4, 6, and 7 correctly stated the law, and specifically applied it to the facts
of the case.

~ot

giving them was prejudicial to appellant, and
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advantangeous to the prosecution.

The jury was left to mis-

apply the law according to their whims and emotions, and what
they thought was proper.

Such instructions are not conducive

"to a just administration of the law,,. and indeed have resulted
in a miscarriage of justice in the case at bar.

The erroneous

instructions therefore require that appellant's conviction be
reversed.
POINT III
THE JURY'S VERDICT OF GUILTY OF FAILURE
TO STOP VEHICLE AT COMMAND OF POLICE
OFFICER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY TEE EVIDENCE.
The statute under which appellant was charged states:
41-6-169.10. Failure to stop
vehicle at command of police
officer--Penalties.--Stopping
vehicle at command of police
officer.--Any driver who, having
received a visual or audible
signal from a police officer to
bring his vehicle to a stop,
operates his vehicle in willful
or wanton disregard of such
signal so as to interfere with
or endanger the operation of the
police vehicle, or any other
vehicle or person, or who increases his speed and attempts
to flee or elude the police shall
upon conviction . . . .
(U.C.A. 1953, emphasis added.)
Since the definition of '\villful" is precisely the
same as the definition of "intentional" (see 76-2-103(1), U.C.A.
(1953) and Point I of this brief), it necessarily follows that
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appellant could not be convicted of this offense, since he
lacked the requisite mental element prescribed by the legislature.
Further, while the term "wanton" is not defined in
the Utah Criminal Code, Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth
Edition) notes that the state of mind connoted by "wantonness"
requires a "[c]onscious doing of some act . . . " (p. 1753-4).
Appellant concedes that, in some cases, "wanton" may
be defined as "

. characterized by extreme recklessness,

. . . " (Black's Law Dictionary, supra, p. 1753), but in this
case such a definition should not be applied.

It is difficult

to see how one could "recklessly" fail to stop upon a clear
command of a police officer.

The failure to stop, in order to

be an offense, must be a conscious, intentional failure.
Where the person who fails to so stop lacks the capacity to form a conscious, intentional state of mind, then his
act is not an offense under the statute.
POINT IV
THE REVOCATION OF APPELLANT'S PROBATION
OFFENDS THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
Appellant's probation was revoked on the grounds that
he "refused to take a breathalyzer test, and was involved in
violent behavior."

(Judgment Roll and Index, p. 93; Hearing

Transcript - 64.)
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The original judgment, after appellant's jury trial,
placed him on probation subject to certain terms and conditions, among them the following:
4.
That the said defendant submit
to a breathalyzer test at the discretion of the Adult Probation and
Parole Department within reasonable
circumstances and laws; .
(Judgment Roll and Index, p. 85.)
Appellant executed an agreement on February 20, 1979,
which states, in pertinent part, that he agreed
6.
To violate no penal law of
any local, state, or federal
government and to be of good behavior.

12. To abide by the following
special conditions, . . . (4)
voluntarily submit to a breathalyzer exam upon request of AP&P
agent . .
(Judgment Roll and
Index, p. 87.)
Unquestionably, appellant, as a probationer, did not
enjoy the same expectation of privacy as would a normal citizen.

Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions

against unreasonable searches still have application to the
case of a probationer (or parolee) , and a probationer has
standing to raise Fourth Amendment rights (United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); State v.
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Allison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 1970) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938
(1971); Latta v. Fitzhanis, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) cert. denied
423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521
F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Schlosser, 202 N.W.2d 136
(N.D. 1972)).
The terms of a probation agreement must meet the
Fourth Amendment's standards of reasonableness (United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzales, supra).
It is generally recognized that a probation officer
may search a probationer's horne on less than probable cause.
Generally, it is sufficient that the probation officer have a
good-faith reasonable belief to suspect that probationer has
violated the terms of his probation.

However, the Fourth Amend-

ment forbids searches conducted by a probation officer that
are arbitrary and abusive.

Among the searches that are arbi-

trary and abusive are those conducted at unreasonable hours
(United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follete, 282 F. Supp. 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); People v. Hernandez, 229 C.A.2d 143, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 100 (1964) cert. denied 381 U.S. 953 (1965) .)
The trial court recognized the fact that appellant
could only be asked to submit to a breathalyzer test at a
reasonable time (see Hr. Tr. 20).
Apparently, the trial court based its finding that
it was reasonable to request appellant to submit to a breathalyzer test on the facts that
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the probation officer had a
report that [appellant] had
been violent, and secondly that
he had been drinking, that on
his approaching him [i.e.
knocking on appellant's bedroom
door at 1:00 a.m.] at first he
got no response and then the
response he got was in the
nature of violence, in that he
opened the door and suddenly
grabbed [the probation officer]
and ripped his shirt.
[Hr. Tr. 65.]
The "report" that appellant had been violent and had
been drinking emanated solely from Ms. Begay.

According to

Officer Larry Penrod, Ms. Begay stated that she "lived with
her boyfriend," appellant, that he had "grabbed her hair,"
"beat her," "threw her outside," and "threatened her with a
gun or something."

(Hr. Tr. 29.)

Ms. Begay was not present at the revocation hearing.
On the night in question, she had been drinking, and, in the
opinion of probation officer Evan Reid, she "could have been"
intoxicated (Hr. Tr. 23).
Appellant testified that Ms. Begay had spent only
the previous night at his residence, and that she had slept on
the couch in the living room (Hr. Tr. 54,55).

After he had

retired for the night, he was awakened by Ms. Begay, who was
hitting him, while yelling and screaming (Hr. Tr. 56).

Appel-

lant further stated:
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And I jumped out of bed. And
the door was partly opened and
I took and pushed her out there
on the living room couch. I told
her to 'sleep in your bed and
tomorrow morning you can take
you [sic] stuff out of here, because I'm not going to put up
with something like that.' And
I went back to my bedroom. But
before I could close the door,
she hit it full force and knocked
the door into my head. And I
still -- I was kind of sleepy.
That made me a little bit out of
hand with myself and so I grabbed
her by the arm and escorted her
between the partition between the
dining room and living room and on
into the kitchen. She might have
tripped there in the kitchen. But
I opened the door and deposited her
out there on the porch and stated
to her:
'Get sober before you
come back in. '

I closed the kitchen door and walked
back into the house into my bedroom.
I closed my door and locked it, because I didn't want her barging in
and hitting me anymore.
(Hr. Tr. 57.)
The testimony of appellant on this matter is entirely
uncontradicted.

It was also uncontradicted that when the pro-

bation officer [Mr. Reid) requested appellant to submit to a
breathalyzer test, he had absolutely no information or knowledge of his own perception that appellant had consumed any
alcoholic beverage (Hr. Tr. 21).
Under these facts, it is difficult to see how it is
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reasonable to request appellant to submit to a breathalyzer
test.

The hour was approximately 1:00 a.m.

be at work early in the morning.

Appellant had to

(The trial court conceded

"At least it's true, [the appellant has] a good work record."
(Hr. Tr. 67.).)

The probation officer had absolutely no

personal knowledge that appellant had been drinking.

While

beer cans were seen in the living room area, where Ms. Begay
had been staying, none were seen in appellant's room.

Further,

Hs. Begay was apparently intoxicated, and appellant's roommate, Mr. Diamanti, was in such a "deep sleep" (i.e. passed
out) that he could not be awakened by the probation officer's
shaking him (Hr. Tr. 21).

It is at once apparent that the

empty beer cans seen were, in all probability, consumed solely
by Mr. Diamanti and Ms. Begay.
As to the "violence" when appellant ripped the probation officer's shirt, this confrontation was "extremely
short," in the probation officer's own words (Hr. Tr. 8).

It

must be remembered that it was roughly 1:00 a.m., and that
appellant had already been rudely awakened, and indeed technically battered, that night.

To say that this incident vio-

lated the term of the probation agreement requiring appellant
"[t]o violate no penal law .

and to be of good behavior"

(Judgment Roll and Index, p. 87) would be absurdly over-technical.

Nor can it be said that such conduct, of itself, would

give rise to a reasonable belief that appellant had been
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drinking.
Nor can the presence of beer cans in the living room
be a basis for a reasonable belief that appellant had been
drinking them.

As discussed above, there are more obvious in-

ferences as to who was drinking the beer.
Moreover, all of the "evidence" of appellant's
alleged probation violation was the result of an illegal entry
and search, and therefore could not serve as a basis to revoke
appellant's parole.
It is uncontradicted that no search warrant was involved, nor was the entry and search made incident to an arrest.
The trial court apparently validated the entry and search on
the ground of consent by a third person, Hs. Begay (see Hr. Tr.
11).

The court stated:
Well, of course, it's the opinion
of the Court that Hs. Begay \vould
have some proprietary interest in
that residence. There's enough of
a showing she lived there. She
made that representation to the
officers. She was the one that
opened the door. Her clothes were
in the defendant's room, obviously,
which he admits he thre>v out to her;
and that she \Vas living there. So
it's the Court's opinion she would
have a proprietary interest there.
Whether she's paying the rent or so
on, of course, it is immaterial to
the Court. So therefore the motion,
of course, to dismiss is denied.
(Hr. Tr. 62. )
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Appellant contends that in this respect the trial
court erred.

There was virtually no showing that Ms. Begay

lived in appellant's horne.
As to representations made to the officers, Probation Officer Evan Reid and the prosecuting attorney engaged in
the following colloquy:

Q

How did you get entrance
into the horne?

A

Ms. Lucille Begay stated
she had lived there, that
Mr. Potter had asked her
to reside with him. And
she opened the door and
let us into the residence.
(Hr. Tr. 5.)

Nowhere is there an affirmative statement that Ms.
Begay was presently living in appellant's horne.

The phrase

"had lived there" connotes a condition in the past, which had
since terminated.

The phrase, "Mr. Potter had asked her to

reside with him" obviously does not mean that in fact she was
presently "living" in his horne.
It is impossible to see how Ms. Begay's act of opening the door can be construed as showing "a sufficient proprietary interest" to consent to a search.
Nor is the fact that appellant allowed Ms. Begay to
keep her clothes in his dresser persuasive of the fact that
she was living in the horne.

It is not unusual for a guest to
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put his or her clothes in an appropriate closet or dresser
for even a one-night stay in a hotel.
Indeed, the fact that all of Ms. Begay's clothing
was to be found in only one drawer is extremely corroborative
of the fact that she was merely a guest in the horne for one or
two nights.
There is the further fact that appellant had locked
his door to keep Ms. Begay out.

It seems unlikely that one

who is living in a horne, and allegedly sleeping with one of
its occupants, would be locked out of the bedroom.
Finally, there is the fact that Ms. Begay could not
even be located anywhere in the area for the hearing.

This is

highly inconsistent with her "living" in appellant's horne.
In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct.
988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
. . . the consent of one who
possesses common authoritl over
premises or effects is va id as
against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is shared.
(415 U.S. at 170, emphasis
added.)
As to what constitutes "common authority, the Court
noted:
Common authority is, of course,
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not to be implied from the mere
property interest a third party
has in the property. The authority which justifies the thirdparty consent does not rest upon
the law of property, with its
attendant historical and legal
refinements . . . but rests
rather on mutual use of the
property by persons generally
having joint access or control
for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any
of the co-inhabitants has the
right to permit the inspection
in his own right and that the
others have assumed the r~sk
that one of their number might
permit the common area to be
searched.
(415 U.S. at 71,
n. 7, emphasis added.)
In United States v. Reisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir.
1974) it was held that a co-tenant who had a legal right to
enter a portion of premises used by a defendant, but not a
factual "possessor right," could not consent to a search there.
In United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1976) it was
held that an occasional visitor could not validly consent to a
search.
Under the logic of the foregoing, it is clear that
the facts of the case at bar simply fail to disclose a sufficient "common authority" over appellant's horne to enable Ms.
Begay to consent to a search thereof.
The facts of the instant case disclose an additional
element usually not present in "consent to search" cases.
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Here the consent was given out of a deliberate, hostile motive
to appellant.

While this author could find no case which

specifically based a holding on this point, the case of United
States ex rel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir.
1970) contained the following interesting dicta:
The right of one party to consent
to a search which affects the
interest of another derives from
the consenting party's equal right
of possession or control of the
same premises or property as the
other. Such cases fall into three
classes. In one class a party
having a joint right of control
consents to a search directed only
at himself and not at the other,
but it discloses evidence harmful
to the other. A second class consists of those cases in which one
having a joint right of control
consents to a search which he
knows is directed at the other
although he does so in the independent exercise of his right of
joint control. The justification
of the search in both these classes
of cases results from the impossibility of severing the joint right
of control and the undesirability
of permitting the exercise of the
right of one to be limited by the
right of the other.
A new and intruding element which
has not been isolated heretofore
may be said to distinguish a third
class of cases. This element is
the consenting party's agreement
to the search out of motives of
hostility to the other, made with
the intent to harm him by an antagonistic consent. ~mere it is
possible to identify this element
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a serious question would arise
whether the right to consent is
not spent when it reaches this
point of deliberate antagonistic
intrusion on the rights of the
other who has an equal right to
possession or control. This
would be especially true where
a wife intentionally acts
against her husband's interest,
since she would not be acting
in harmony with the marital relationship from which her joint
right of ownership or control is
derived, but in antagonism to it.
(431 F.2d at 842-43.)
Of course, here we are dealing with the alleged consent of one who is only an occasional visitor.

Her intentional

hostile act toward appellant is obviously antagonistic to any
kind of relationship by which she might arguably be said to
have a right of "common authority," so that on this additional
ground, her consent should be deemed invalid.
In any case where there is a search without a warrant, the government bears the burden of showing that the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment (United States
v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel.
Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz. 431 F.2d 839 (3rd Cir. 1970)).

Here,

the state has failed to do so.
Therefore under the total facts of this case, the
revocation of appellant's probation constitutes a denial of
his Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable
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searches, which this court must no allow,
POINT V
THE REVOCATION OF APPELLANT'S PROBATION
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
As discussed above in Point IV, the evidence presented at the revocation hearing showed rather clearly that the
probation officer's request that appellant submit to a breathalyzer test was unreasonable, both as to the circumstances of
the request, and the hour at which the request came.

Evidence

of a refusal to submit to an unreasonable request to take a
breathalyzer test is obviously not sufficient to revoke a probation,
As to evidence that appellant had engaged in "violent
behavior" sufficient to revoke his probation, it is to be noted
that all "evidence" regarding the alleged assault on Ms. Begay
was purely uncorroborated, unsubstantiated hearsay.

The source

of the hearsay, Ms. Begay herself, was, at the time she uttered
the statements, intoxicated, and motivated by extreme antagonism towards appellant.

Those uncorroborated hearsay state-

ments are patently and inherently unreliable, and cannot be
used as a basis to commit appellant to the penitentiary.
While there is no doubt good evidence that appellant
indeed tore the probation officer's shirt, the context in which
this happened must be remembered.
"extremely short" (Hr. Tr. 8).

The confrontation was

It occurred at 1.00 a.m., at
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the door to appellant's bedroom (Hr. Tr. 6).

Appellant had

that evening already been subjected to a rude awakening and
technical battery at the hands of Ms. Begay.

He was again

roused from sleep, in his own home, in the middle of the
night, by a persistent knocking on his bedroom door.

Upon

opening the door, out of the total darkness of his bedroom,
he was greeted by two flashlight beams shining towards him
(Hr. Tr. 43).
Appellant was, in the words of Officer Hansen, "quite
upset" (Hr. Tr. 43).

Under the totality of circumstances, his

reaction was quite normal.

It is of great significance that

although two probation officers and at least three peace officers were present when the confrontation occurred, there was
not the slightest suggestion that appellant had committed a
crime, even a misdemeanor, in their presence.

If so, appel-

lant could have been expediently arrested on the spot.
In fact, appellant's alleged "violent behavior" was,
on all counts, justified and neither a violation of any penal
law, nor an episode of "bad behavior" sufficient to revoke his
probation.

In short, the evidence produced at the revocation

hearing cannot support the revocation of his probation.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, on the morning of February 22, 1978, appellant engaged in behavior that was dangerously antisocial.

He
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might well have been guilty of exhibition of a deadly weapon
(§

76-10-506, U.C.A. (1953)), public intoxication (§ 76-10-506,

U.C.A. (1953)), Driving Under the Influence (41-6-44, U.C.A.
(1953)), as these misdemeanor offenses do not require as an
element the highly culpable "intentional" or "willful" states
of mind.
It is equally clear that appellant could not, and
did not, entertain a specific intent to commit a robbery.
While it is unquestioned the State has a vital interest in protecting the public, it may not do so by branding one
a felon, when in fact no felony was committed.
~or

may the State imprison a man (even a properly

convicted felon, which appellant is not) on the basis of
alleged probation violations, when there is no reliable evidence
that in fact the terms and conditions of the probation were
violated.
There are ample "remedies" available to the State to
protect society, and appellant, from the type of incident
which occurred on February 22, 1978.

But charging, and obtain-

ing a conviction for a crime which in fact could not and did
not occur is not among them.

To again quote State v. Brown,

. . . to sentence a man to the
penitentiary for a crime that he
did not have the mental capacity
to commit would be intolerable.
(102 P. at 646, emphasls added.)
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This court should reverse and remand for an entry
of acquittal to the counts charging aggravated robbery and
• failure to stop on command of a police officer.

It should as

v1ell reverse the trial court's revocation of appellant's probation.
DATED this

/:f~day of October, 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

HANSEN AND HANSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
250 East Broadway, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Brief of Appellant were served on the Utah Attorney General's
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
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